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1 Introduction
Despite the rapid increase in female educational attainment over the last decades, the
labour market outcomes of men and women still differ in terms of wages and seniority.
The literature on gender wage gaps is vast, but differences across genders in promotions
have received much less attention. Yet these gaps can be large. For example, Bertrand
and Hallock (2001) find that women account for only 2.5% of top executives in US firms
and for France, Gobillon et al. (2015) show that the gender gap in the probability of
being an executive increases along the wage ladder from 9% to 50%. Existing work
has shown that differences in characteristics account for a large proportion of the gap,
with the remaining fraction being usually attributed to preferences or discrimination (for
an overview of work on gender wage gaps see Blau and Kahn, 2000). Measuring the
role played by these two aspects has proven difficult. This paper uses the particular
features of the French academic system, namely the fact that promotions occur through
national contests involving successive steps, to look at various possible causes for the
lower promotion rates of females.
The observed promotion rates may be due to lower success rates of female candidates
or to them being less likely than men to seek promotion. The argument that women
do not seek promotion is often found in popular discussion without clear evidence of its
relevance. Measuring the importance of this mechanism has proven difficult as in most
contexts only information on applicants and their success rate tend to be known (see,
for example Goldin and Rouse, 2000). In France, academic promotion occurs through a
national contest or concours, with the list of applicants being publicly available at the time
of the concours. Moreover, because academics are public servants, we have information on
all those holding junior positions which constitute the pool of ‘potential applicants’. We
can hence examine not only whether gender affects a candidate’s promotion probability,
but also whether it impacts the decision to be a candidate.
Focusing on the academic labour market has certain advantages. Unlike in many
private sector jobs, where a promotion is associated with longer hours, academics have
similar obligations and constraints at all hierarchical levels. Even if more senior academics
tend to be involved in university administration and outside responsibilities, these activi-
ties are not mandatory. Female associate professors should thus not feel more constrained
in terms of combining career and family duties by becoming full professors, and there is
hence no obvious reason why they would prefer not to be promoted. Male and female aca-
demics are also likely to have rather homogeneous labour market attachment, as argued
by Kahn (1995), removing one of the reasons often branded to justify lower promotion
rates for females. A further advantage of these data is that a major consideration in
actual promotion decisions, an individual’s productivity in terms of number and quality
of publications, can be observed and thus controlled for by the researcher.
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In this context, we consider the two stages of promotion. On the one hand, women
may be less likely to be promoted conditional on having applied, and a possible cause
of this could be discrimination. On the other hand, female academics may have a lower
propensity to apply for promotion than males, which could be explained by the require-
ments of the contest being more costly for women, their valuing the promotion less, the
expectation of discrimination, or simply to an unwillingness to enter the contest. The
particular features of the French academic system, such as a national salary scale and
the existence of several categories of academics with different requirements during the
contest and upon promotion, allow us to investigate these hypotheses.
We use exhaustive data for academic economists in France over the period 1991 to
2008, and find that the promotion rate of women is half as low as that of men. We then
consider separately the determinants of the likelihood to enter a promotion concours and
the probability of being promoted conditional on having entered the concours. Being a
woman has a significant negative impact on the likelihood to enter the concours. The
probability of being a candidate is 50% higher for men, and this gap is solely explained
by gender. The conditional probability of promotion is also lower for women than for
men, but the gap is not statistically significant. Interestingly, we have information about
the various steps of the promotion decision. Candidates are first declared ‘admissible’
and then the committee decides whom to promote amongst these. We find that the
main difference across the genders is in the first stage, with women being less likely
to be considered admissible, while in the final stage, candidates are more likely to be
promoted if female. A possible interpretation of such results is that positive conscious
discrimination occurs in the final stage while negative unconscious discrimination takes
place early on when evaluating the worth of women’s research output. Overall, the lower
propensity to apply accounts for between 50% and 76% of the promotion gap.
The paper adds to a vast body of work on the different rates of promotion across
genders; see, amongst others, Lazear and Rosen (1990) and Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller
(1997). In their influential paper, Goldin and Rouse (2000) use data from American
orchestras to examine the gender gap in hiring and promotion. Their results indicate
that discrimination against women was a crucial factor in the 1970s. We address a
similar question but use much more recent data, and exploit our knowledge of who could
have been a candidate to identify the effect of decisions taken at this stage on observed
promotions.
Our analysis contributes to a recent literature that focuses on gender gaps in academia,
dating back to the seminal work of Cole and Cole (1973). Recent work indicates that in
the US salary gaps are explained by differences in academic rank, while promotions are
affected by gender even after controlling for research output and demographic characteris-
tics.1 Evidence for the UK by Blackaby et al. (2005) indicates that there are both gaps in
1See Johnson and Stafford (1974), Farber (1977), Ginther and Hayes (1999) and Ginther and Kahn
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promotions and in within-rank pay across genders, while Sabatier (2010) documents the
existence of a promotion gap in France. Most of this literature has considered the US and
the UK, which have an academic labour market with much greater wage and promotion
flexibility than those found in most European countries. We examine whether promo-
tion gaps also exist in a labour market that operates in an entirely different way, with
salaries being fixed at the country-wide level and promotions being decided by national
committees and not by the department where the individual is employed.
The paper is also related to a number of recent analyses which focus on the effect
of the sex of committee members on female promotions.2 This literature generally does
not support the idea that having more women in a committee increases the probability
of success of female candidates. We focus on a different aspect of the promotion process,
exploiting information on potential candidates to assess the importance of the decision
of whether or not to apply for promotion. Lastly, a growing body of experimental work
has addressed differences between male and female attitudes towards competition and
argued that women tend to be less likely to enter competitive situations than men.3 Our
result that women have a lower probability than men to enter the concours is consistent
with the experimental evidence.
The paper is organised as follows. After describing the French academic system, Sec-
tion 2 examines the possible reasons why women are less likely to be promoted. Section 3
describes the data and our results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.
2 Why are there so few female professors?
2.1 The French academic system
The French academic system has a number of features that we intend to exploit. There
are two types of academic positions in France. The most common are university positions,
where the individual is a professor with a substantial teaching load. There exist also a
number of public research instances, of which the largest is the CNRS, that have full
research positions.4 Researchers in this category are hired by the CNRS, who pay their
salaries, but are attached to a university and participate in department life.
For all types of position there is an entry level category equivalent to assistant pro-
fessor, termed ‘Rank B’, which includes the maˆıtre de confe´rences positions at the uni-
versity and the charge´ de recherche at the CNRS. The individual can then be promoted
to ‘Rank A’, the equivalent to full professor, a position denoted directeur de recherche at
(2004). Some studies claim a decline in the promotion gap over time, while others find that it is large
even in recent decades; see McDowell et al. (2001) and Ginther and Kahn (2004).
2See, for example, Lavy (2008), Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) and Bagues et al. (2017).
3See Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Niederle and Vesterlund (2011) and Gupta et al. (2013).
4CNRS stands for Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.
4
the CNRS. Both rank A and rank B positions are tenured. The promotion from rank B
to rank A entails a substantial salary increase, with the salary scales being set by the
Ministry of Higher Education and Research and identical for university professors and
researchers as well as across departments.5
In several fields, notably economics, promotions take place through a national contest,
a concours, with the decision taken by a committee consisting of academic economists
of the full professor rank. Participation in this contest and the final ranking are public
information. There is no limit to the number of times a candidate may apply for a rank A
position. The fact that departments do not make promotion decisions is important for
our purposes.6 In a system in which there is a positive correlation between prestige
and promotion threshold, women could choose to select into less prestigious department
because promotion is easier in those, and hence the measured gap would underestimate
the actual promotion gap.
The requirements of the concours differ across the two tracks. For university profes-
sors the contest is termed concours d’agre´gation. Over our sample period, the agre´gation
was biannual and entailed four stages over, approximately, a 6-month period. It in-
cluded a research seminar and three oral exams, one of which consisted of preparing in
24 hours a lecture on a topic randomly drawn from a lengthy predetermined list. At the
various stages of the competition, a number of candidates are eliminated, and after the
penultimate stage a list of candidates that are admissible is provided by the jury. These
candidates then undertake the final test, after which a ranking of all successful candidates
is provided. The concours hence takes time and requires substantial preparation outside
the candidate’s field of expertise. In contrast, the effort involved in the CNRS promotion
concours is minimal. The candidate simply declares him/herself a candidate and submits
a vitae and a research project to the committee. This concours takes place annually and
does not involve any meeting between the candidate and the committee.
There is a second difference in the costs. For university professors, a list of open
positions is published and at the end of the concours candidates choose, sequentially and
starting with the highest ranked, which department to join. When promoted, individuals
are usually not able to stay in the university where they held a rank B position.7 After
three years they are allowed to move to another university, if the latter wishes to recruit
them, including their former university. CNRS researchers that are promoted can choose
to stay at the university where they are or move. The university does not need to have
5Some departments pay, out of their own funds, an extra salary on top of the one paid by the
university/CNRS. This practice is, however, restricted to only a few members in a handful of departments.
6Some internal promotions exist for individuals that have undertaken substantial administrative tasks
at the university, but they are rare. See Combes et al. (2008) for more details.
7In our sample, 81.8% of those promoted through the agre´gation have a new affiliation after their
promotion. Only 3.4% of available positions were within commuting distance of Paris (urban area). On
average, successful candidates had to move 674 kilometers. This is large: would France be a disk, its
radius would be around 420 kilometers.
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an open position for them since the researchers move with their position.
It is obvious that promotion is very costly for university professors. The agre´gation
involves an ex-ante cost in terms of preparing the exams and a substantial cost ex-post
because of the geographical mobility involved in being promoted to full professor. Since
candidates seeking to become full professor are typically between 30 and 40 years of age,
the process occurs at a moment in the life cycle when family constraints are likely to be
substantial. If women are less geographically mobile than men, then the cost is likely to
be greater for them.
2.2 Discrimination, differences in payoffs or self-selection?
Although a substantial literature has examined the promotion gap across genders, a clear
explanation is still lacking. Women may be less likely to be promoted either because
they apply for promotion less often than men or because of a lower probability of being
promoted conditional on being a candidate. In turn, gender differences in the underlying
probabilities may have three possible causes: discrimination, differences across genders
in the costs and benefits of promotion, and different attitudes towards the promotion
process itself. The French system presents a number of features that will allow us to
evaluate the various hypotheses.
To understand the possible mechanisms in operation consider the following model of
promotion. Suppose that individual i is a potential candidate for promotion at time t
and let the subscript j = u, r denote whether the model applies to university professors
or researchers. A candidate’s promotion probability is the product of the probability of
success conditional on having applied, Prj(S, i, t), and the likelihood that s/he applies
for promotion Prj(A, i, t). The decision whether to be a candidate is in turn determined
by a comparison between individual costs and benefits from entering the contest. An
individual will be a candidate if and only if the expected cost, Cij, is lower than the
product of the expected probability of success and the value of being promoted, Vijt.
That is, if Cij < Prj(S, i, t)× Vijt.
The (conditional) probability of success of individual i at time t is assumed to be
given by
Prj(S, i, t) = pj0 + p
f
j0 δi +Xit pj1 +Xit p
f
j1 δi + Zit pj2 , (1)
where δi is a dummy taking the value 1 for females, Xit is a vector of measures of the
individual’s research output, Zit is a vector of individual characteristics at date t, such
as age, and the various pjn and p
f
jn (n = 0, 1, 2) are vectors of coefficients.
Taste-based, statistical and implicit discrimination all imply that female candidates
are less likely to be promoted, i.e. pfj0 < 0. Implicit discrimination may appear if com-
mittees believe that for a given publication track women are on average less deserving,
for example if women are believed to contribute less than their male coauthor to a joint
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paper.8 Discrimination can reduce female promotion rates directly as well as indirectly
as a lower probability of success will reduce the likelihood that women apply. Also, the
decision to apply is based on the expected probability of success. Hence, if women believe
that they will be discriminated against, they will be less likely to apply for promotion
than men irrespective of whether they are actually discriminated.
Women may also differ from men in the costs of and rewards from promotion and
this can make them less willing to apply for promotion, causing ‘self-selection’ out of the
promotion race. We suppose that costs are given by Cij = cj + c
f
j δi. For researchers,
cost parameters are given by cr = c0 and c
f
r = c
f
0 , where the terms c0 and c
f
0 capture
any psychological or subjective costs incurred when taking part in a contest that may
differ for men and women. The differences can be due to an unwillingness of women
to participate in contests or to the fact that women tend to fear losing tournaments or
contests more than men.9 Higher subjective costs of competing hence may lead women
to apply less often than men.
We suppose that these subjective costs are the same across tracks,10 and assume that
for the university track the overall costs are given by cu = c0 + c1 and c
f
u = c
f
0 + c
f
1 , where
the terms c1 and c
f
1 are the objective costs due to the time required to prepare the contest
and the expected probability of moving place of residence. Differences in intra-household
bargaining power could make it harder for female than for male professors to impose the
cost of moving on their families, thus making cf1 > 0.
Turning to the value of being promoted, we suppose it takes the form Vit = v0 + (v1 +
vf1 δi)Incomet. The intrinsic value of the promotion is given by v0, which we assume
is common across sexes, while the variable Incomet captures the increase in income
associated with promotion. Men and women may have different preferences over income
if, for example, women have a lower marginal utility of income because they are the
second earner in the household, in which case vf1 < 0.
In this context, we consider three hypotheses. First, we examine whether there is a
negative impact of being female on the conditional probability of promotion, captured by
pfj0 < 0. Second, we examine the determinants of the likelihood to apply for promotion.
If women were less likely to apply, this might be due to them having higher objective
costs of promotion. Because the costs of the agre´gation are higher than those of seeking
promotion as a researcher, we have cfu > c
f
r , i.e. we expect to find a more negative
8See Bertrand et al. (2005) for a discussion of implicit discrimination and Wenneras and Wold (1997)
on differences in the way in which male and female research output is valued by committees.
9See, for instance Buser (2016).
10It is not obvious whether the degree of competition is greater for university professors or for re-
searchers. On the one hand, a much smaller number of researchers are promoted each year in the CNRS
than in the concours d’agre´gation, but the number of potential candidates is also larger in the latter. On
the other, although the list of candidates and rankings are available on internet for both, the agre´gation
solicits much greater interest from the academic community, with results at each stage being widely
followed and discussed, which increases the preasure on candidates.
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effect of being female on the probability of applying for promotion for professors than
for researchers. Alternatively, women may apply less either because they expect to be
discriminated against (i.e. they expect pfj0 < 0), they have different preference for income,
vf1 < 0, or they are less willing to take part in contests because of a higher subjective
cost of competing captured by cf0 > 0.
2.3 Empirical specification
Our empirical analysis considers five possible outcomes: the unconditional probability of
being promoted, denoted Prj(P, i, t), the probability of applying, Prj(A, i, t), the probabi-
lity of success conditional on applying, Prj(S, i, t), and, in the case of university professors,
the probabilities of being declared admissible conditional on applying, Prj(Ad, i, t), and
of succeeding conditional on being admissible, Prj(SAd, i, t).
We consider the same specification for all probabilities. For an outcome O where
O = P,A, S,Ad, SAd, we have
Prj(O, i, t) = βj0 + β
f
j0 δi + βj1 Ageit + βj2 Age
2
it + βj3 Pubit + βj4 Pubit ×Quantity it
+ βj5 Pubit ×Quality it + βj6 Int. Departmentit + βj7 Ile de Franceit.(2)
The outcome is a function of age Ageit and its square, whether or not individual i has
published in Econlit-classed journals (‘publisher’ dummy Pubit), the number of publica-
tions and their average quality, denoted respectively Quantity it and Quality it, both in logs
(see below for the exact measurement). With δi being a dummy for females, β
f
j0 measures
the differences in the probability for men and women with the same characteristics. The
dummy Int. Departmentit has a value of 1 if the candidate is in a top department and
that denoted Ile de Franceit has a value of 1 if the individual holds a position in Paris
or within commuting distance of it (see below for the details).
These last two variables have several interpretations. They could measure the positive
effects of a more stimulating academic environment, be an indicator of peer pressure to
seek promotion, or capture higher unobserved ability since the best junior candidates
will have been recruited by the departments with the highest research quality or in a
particularly attractive location. There are also externalities due to having colleagues
who are simultaneously preparing the agre´gation.
Obviously, the qualities that lead to promotion conditional on applying are also those
that make a potential candidate apply, hence it is not possible to run a selection model.
We consider a linear probability model and use OLS in the regressions, although, as we
discuss below, a number of robustness analyses on the functional form are performed.
Our central question is whether the coefficients βfj0 in the regressions are significantly
different from zero, implying that gender affects outcomes. We will also examine the
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differences between the coefficients estimated for the two tracks, at the university or
CNRS. Recall that the cost of applying differs considerably across tracks, hence if high
costs were preventing women from applying we would expect to find a higher value for
βfu0 than for β
f
r0.
3 The Data
Our sample consists of the entire population of French academic economists provided
by the French Ministry of Higher Education and Research and the CNRS for the years
1991-2008. We have information on age, rank, publications and department. We keep
only individuals that are in departments larger than 4 full-time equivalent academics,
which removes universities without real economics departments. Data on individuals’
family life, such as whether they are married and the number and ages of children, are
not available. For the US, Ginther and Kahn (2004) find that having children has only
a weak effect on the promotion probabilities of female economists in the US and none
on their productivity. Moreover, having children and deciding to pass the agre´gation
may be simultaneous decisions, as women may choose to postpone childbirth until after
promotion, thus it is difficult to view family circumstances as exogenous variables.
We use the list of candidates that applied to and those who succeeded in becoming a
rank A professor or researcher. For professors we have data for the nine biannual concours
taking place from 1992 to 2008, while for researchers we have the thirteen annual concours
between 1996 and 2008. All the years are pooled together for each track.
Although all academic economists of rank B the year prior to the concours are eligible
for promotion, it is important to consider how to define potential candidates. It is possible
for CNRS researchers to take the agre´gation, and some individuals in our dataset do so.
In contrast, although it is in principle possible for rank B university professors to apply
for a rank A CNRS position, there are no such individuals in our data. We will hence
consider all rank B individuals as potential candidates for the agre´gation but only those
with a CNRS rank B position as potential candidates to promotion to rank A at CNRS.
A second question is how to deal with older candidates, who may have characteristics
that may make them choose not to apply for promotion. In order to avoid having in our
pool an increasing number of candidates unlikely to apply we introduce age limits. We
hence consider only individuals aged between 32 and 55.11
We define two categories of departments, somewhat equivalent to the division in the
US between the top-50 and other departments. France has a substantial number of na-
tional academic publications in French, and hence we define prestigious departments as
11Our results hold with different bounds, see the supplementary material, Bosquet et al. (2017). Sample
attrition could also be important. In fact, 16.4% of men and 13.9% of women leave the sample before
2008 at age less than 55, indicating that women do no leave academia more often than men.
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those that have the largest research output in international journals (see the supplemen-
tary material). For this reason, we will term them ‘international’ departments and the
rest ‘national’ departments. The international departments account for about one third
of the academics each year.
3.1 Measuring research output
We measure individual output at date t by the cumulative publication record between
the first year of publication and date t.12 Publication records are measured as weighted
sums of publications. All publications come from the EconLit database over the period
1969 and 2008. Three dimensions enter the weighted scheme of publications: the quality
of journals, the number of authors and the relative number of pages. We measure the
quality of publications using the journal ranking proposed by Combes and Linnemer
(2010), divide each publication by the number of authors, and weight by the number of
pages to capture the idea that longer articles contain more ideas, considering an article’s
length relative to the average length in that journal the same year.13
The output of individual i at date t is thus a weighted sum of individual i’s articles
published between the individual’s first year of publication, t0i, and date t, so that
yit =
∑
ai∈[t0i,t]
W (ai)
n(ai)
p(ai)
p¯t
, (3)
where p(ai) is the number of pages of article ai written by i between t0i and t, p¯t the
average number of pages of articles in the journal for the year of publication, n(ai) the
number of authors of the article, and W (ai) the weighting scheme for journals. Each indi-
vidual receives three scores: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual has at least one
publication in an EconLit-listed journal between t0i and t, the number of single-author-
equivalent published articles (‘quantity’),
∑
ai∈[t0i,t] 1/n(ai), and the average quality of
these publications, defined as yit divided by the quantity.
12As an alternative, we have computed degressive publication scores, with older publications having
a smaller weight than recent ones. Measuring research output this way does not change our results (see
the supplementary material).
13EconLit includes more than 560,000 papers published between 1969 and 2008 in more than 1200
journals, including 46 in French. Combes and Linnemer (2010) provide weights for all EconLit journals
using various recursive impact factors built from Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge impact factors
and from Google Scholar citations. Two different degrees of convexity in the distribution of journals’
weights are proposed and we use the most convex one (i.e. the one that most values quality), but our
results are unchanged when we use the least convex one (see the supplementary material). Gibson et al.
(2014) show that this is the journal ranking that best explains the salaries at the University of California
economics departments.
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3.2 Descriptive statistics
In order to run regressions equivalent to those found in the literature on promotions
in academia, where only outcomes are observed, we construct a sample that includes all
rank A and rank B academics for each of the years that we will be using latter on. Table 1
gives the decomposition of this sample by gender.
Table 1: Observations and share of rank A by gender and track
rank A Total % Women % Men %
(25.6% of population) (74.4% of population)
Total sample
0 11,322 64.8 3,686 82.3 7,636 58.8
1 6,145 35.2 792 17.7 5,353 41.2
University professors (85% of population)
0 9,797 66.0 3,212 82.8 6,585 60.0
1 5,052 34.0 666 17.2 4,386 40.0
CNRS researchers (15% of population)
0 1,525 58.3 474 79.0 1,051 52.1
1 1,093 41.7 126 21.0 967 47.9
There were between 1,165 and 2,143 academic economists in France depending on the
year, and the vast majority of them are university professors, with researchers accoun-
ting for only 15.0% of the total. Women represent 25.6% of observations, and they are
overrepresented amongst university professors and underrepresented amongst researchers.
This difference could be due to the fact that obtaining a position as a researcher tends
to require a stronger publication record than for university positions and, as we will see
below, women tend to have a weaker research output than men. Slightly over a third
of the population hold a rank A position, with the fraction being lower for university
professors (34.0%) and higher for researchers (41.7%). Overall, the gender promotion
gap is large, 23.5 percentage points on average, and is smaller for university professors
than for researchers (22.8 and 26.9 points, respectively).
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics for the sample of potential candidates. We
have 8,085 observations, including a total of 1,869 different academics, with the average
number of observations per individual being 4.3. The panel is unbalanced as individuals
enter the pool of potential candidates and exit it either because they are promoted or
leave academia/France, or reach the maximum age for us to consider them as potential
candidates. Males are more likely than females to apply for promotion. The probability
of being a candidate to the agre´gation is 6.0% for women and 9.0% for men, while for
researchers these figures are 11.5% and 20.3%. The (unconditional) probabilities of being
promoted on a given year are small, 2% and 4.5% for men, and 1.1% and 1.4% for women,
depending on the track. Again, the promotion probability is at least twice as large for
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of potential candidates
University CNRS
Women Men Diff. Women Men Diff.
Prob. Candidate 0.060 0.090 −0.030a 0.115 0.203 −0.088a
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.014) (0.024)
Prob. Promotion 0.011 0.020 −0.010a 0.017 0.045 −0.028b
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
Age 41.0 43.1 −2.1a 41.3 42.2 −0.9c
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4)
Publisher 0.559 0.590 −0.032a 0.779 0.863 −0.084a
(0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.022) (0.012) (0.024)
Quantity 1.08 1.42 −0.34a 2.63 3.14 −0.51a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.15) (0.11) (0.19)
Quality 0.45 0.44 0.01 1.62 2.02 −0.41
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.27) (0.21) (0.36)
Int. Department 0.309 0.273 0.035a 0.556 0.537 0.018
(0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.026) (0.018) (0.032)
Ile de France 0.349 0.272 0.077a 0.469 0.426 0.043
(0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.026) (0.018) (0.032)
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. a, b, c Difference between men and women significant at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively. Productivity measures (quantity and quality) are in levels. We take
their logs in the regression analysis. There are 8,085 observations from 1,869 individuals and 1,132
observations from 191 individuals in the university and CNRS samples respectively. These correspond
to 601 women (2,647 observations) and 1,268 men (5,438 observations) in the university sample and 61
women (358 observations) and 130 men (774 observations) in the CNRS sample.
men as for women. The probability of having published in EconLit journals is 59.0% and
55.9% for men and women professors, respectively. These figures are not large, but it
is important to bear in mind that our publication criteria is stringent given the strong
tradition in France to publish books and in national journals which are not necessarily
in EconLit. Male professors publish more articles than female professors but we find no
significant difference in the average quality of publications. In the CNRS, differences are
more pronounced and indicate that men also have a greater quantity of publications. The
aspect in which women fare better than men is affiliation: women are more often than
men in international departments or in a department in or around Paris (Ile de France).14
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the sample of actual candidates to promotion
and for those promoted. We indicate by a subscript next to the average for men whether
the difference between the male and female averages is statistically significant. The
probabilities of success in the agre´gation are 18.1% for women and 21.6% for men, while
for the CNRS contest these figures are 13.3% and 21.1%. Contrary to the probability
of applying for promotion, these differences are not statistically significant. We find no
significant difference in the quantity or quality of publications.
14Women may be more likely to be in an international department for three reasons: positive discrimi-
nation, higher unobservable ability, or because of joint offers made to couples by top departments.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of candidates and promoted candidates
Candidates Promoted candidates
University CNRS University CNRS
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Prob. Promotion 0.181 0.216 0.133 0.211 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.028) (0.017) (0.051) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 35.8 37.8a 42.8 43.6 34.9 35.9 42.5 40.8
(0.3) (0.2) (0.7) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (2.3) (0.7)
Publisher 0.824 0.809 0.978 0.930 0.882 0.852 1.000 0.949
(0.028) (0.016) (0.022) (0.019) (0.056) (0.032) (0.000) (0.036)
Quantity 2.14 2.37 5.50 4.58 2.39 3.18 5.58 6.54
(0.15) (0.10) (0.59) (0.25) (0.37) (0.28) (1.18) (0.65)
Quality 0.65 0.84 1.38 3.44 1.83 1.90 2.21 9.05
(0.20) (0.16) (0.29) (0.67) (0.90) (0.38) (1.15) (2.75)
Int. Department 0.399 0.287a 0.622 0.562 0.647 0.406b 0.667 0.692
(0.036) (0.019) (0.073) (0.037) (0.083) (0.044) (0.211) (0.075)
Ile de France 0.479 0.327a 0.289 0.443c 0.559 0.461 0.167 0.564c
(0.037) (0.019) (0.068) (0.037) (0.086) (0.044) (0.167) (0.080)
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. a, b, c Difference between men and women significant at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively. Productivity measures (quantity and quality) are in levels. We take their
logs in the regression analysis. There are 781 observations from 522 candidates and 230 observations from
93 candidates in the university and CNRS samples respectively. These correspond to 130 women (188
observations) and 392 men (593 observations) in the university sample and 16 women (45 observations)
and 77 men (185 observations) in the CNRS sample. There are 162 and 45 promoted candidates in the
university and CNRS samples respectively. These correspond to 34 women and 128 men in the university
sample and 6 women and 39 men in the CNRS sample.
We have seen that there are differences in the average research output of male and
female potential candidates. It is possible that there are also differences in its distribution,
and since promoted candidates are selected from the top tail, differences in the thickness
of this tail could explain observed promotion gaps. Figure 1 thus plots the distribution
of the (log) quantity and (log) average quality of research output for men and women.
The distribution of quantity for female professors is to the left of that for males and has
less mass at the top of the distribution, indicating that the most productive men publish
more than the most productive women. There is little difference in the distribution of
quality, although we observe a mild bimodality for men that is absent for women.
4 Results
4.1 The promotion of academic economists
In order to compare our results with existing work, we consider the full sample of French
academic economists and start by examining the determinants of the probability of hol-
ding a rank A position. The results are reported in the first three columns of Table 4,
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Figure 1: Smoothed densities of publication for men and women potential candidates
where all specifications include year fixed effects. In column (1), only gender is included
in the model, with the dummy Woman being equal to 1 for women, and exhibiting a
negative and significant coefficient that implies that women are over 23.3 percentage
points less likely than men to be rank A, a figure comparable to those found for the
US.15 Controlling for age and our measures of research output reduces the gender effect
to -0.045, indicating that a large fraction of the difference in promotions is due to women
being younger and having published less. Column (3) includes interactions between the
gender dummy and publication scores and indicates that men and women do not have
significantly different returns to publications.16
The next four columns of Table 4 consider our sample of potential candidates and
report estimates of the probability of being promoted. There is a one percentage point
raw gap across the genders for university professors, which amounts to women being half
as likely to be promoted in a given year as men. This gap remains unchanged once we
control for age, research output and department type (column 5). The last two columns
concern the CNRS, where the raw gap of 0.029 falls slightly to 0.023 once we include
controls, again amounting to about half the raw promotion probability for men (0.045).
That is, our sample of potential candidates exhibits promotion gaps that are substantial
and, contrary to what we find for the entire population of academic economists, are not
reduced by controlling for age and productivity.
4.2 Decomposing outcomes
The limitation of our analysis so far is that we do not know whether observed promotions
are the result of a lower likelihood to apply for promotion by women or lower success
in obtaining the promotions. We hence examine separately the various steps. We start
by considering what determines the decision to enter the contest, and then move to the
15For the US Ginther and Kahn (2004) find a raw gap of 21.3 percentage points.
16In what follows we will not consider different returns to publications as we found no significant
difference for our other specifications.
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Table 4: Likelihood to hold a rank A position and likelihood of promotion among potential
candidates
Likelihood to
hold a rank A position be promoted (potential candidates)
University CNRS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Woman -0.233a -0.045a -0.043a -0.009a -0.010a -0.029a -0.023b
(0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.011)
Age 0.011a 0.011a -0.009a 0.020a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Age2 0.000b 0.000b 0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher(Pub) 0.316a 0.317a 0.041a 0.032b
(0.021) (0.026) (0.007) (0.015)
Pub*Quantity 0.179a 0.182a 0.015a 0.037a
(0.009) (0.010) (0.003) (0.008)
Pub*Quality 0.034a 0.033a 0.009a 0.011a
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
CNRS -0.114a -0.110a -0.038a
(0.024) (0.028) (0.005)
Woman*Pub 0.001
(0.045)
Woman*Pub*Quantity -0.024
(0.021)
Woman*Pub*Quality 0.007
(0.011)
Woman*CNRS -0.013
(0.057)
Int. Department 0.006 -0.002
(0.004) (0.011)
Ile de France 0.009b 0.018
(0.004) (0.013)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.048 0.392 0.393 0.003 0.051 0.010 0.077
Observations 17,467 17,467 17,467 8,085 8,085 1,132 1,132
Notes: Linear probability model (OLS). Standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. a, b, c
Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Terms interacted with Woman are centered so
that the coefficient associated with Woman is still the average effect of being a woman.
determinants of success in the contest conditional on being a candidate.
4.2.1 Likelihood to enter the concours
The results on the determinants of the likelihood to enter the concours are reported in
Table 5. As expected, research output has a strong effect, with quality having a stronger
impact for researchers.17 Being in an international department is insignificant in both
17The results are robust to the inclusion of higher order terms to capture some non-linearity in the
impact of publications’ quality (see the supplementary material).
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tracks, while being at a department in Paris or within commuting distance of it (Ile de
France) has a significant coefficient only for professors, as expected. In the regression for
the agre´gation we also include a dummy if the candidate holds a rank B CNRS position.
Table 5: Likelihood to apply for a promotion
University CNRS Diff. in Diff. across dept.
diff. University CNRS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Woman -0.030a -0.033a -0.093b -0.071b -0.028a -0.033a -0.071b
(0.008) (0.007) (0.040) (0.036) (0.008) (0.008) (0.036)
Age -0.021a 0.084a -0.008a -0.021a 0.084a
(0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012)
Age2 0.000a -0.002a 0.000 0.000a -0.002a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher(Pub) 0.114a 0.118a 0.124a 0.114a 0.117a
(0.015) (0.045) (0.015) (0.015) (0.045)
Pub*Quantity 0.046a 0.108a 0.046a 0.046a 0.107a
(0.007) (0.028) (0.007) (0.007) (0.028)
Pub*Quality 0.014a 0.022b 0.015a 0.014a 0.022b
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
Int. Department 0.004 0.020 0.007 0.005 0.016
(0.010) (0.048) (0.010) (0.010) (0.050)
Ile de France 0.019b 0.005 0.020b 0.007 0.020
(0.009) (0.043) (0.009) (0.011) (0.058)
CNRS -0.127a -0.127a
(0.011) (0.011)
Woman*CNRS -0.056
(0.036)
Woman*Ile de France 0.032b -0.041
(0.016) (0.077)
Interacted terms No No No No Yes No No
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.005 0.110 0.033 0.194 0.116 0.110 0.195
Observations 8,085 8,085 1,132 1,132 9,217 8,085 1,132
Notes: Linear probability model (OLS). Standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. a, b, c
Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Interacted terms: All variables interacted with
applying to the CNRS concours. Ile de France has been centered in its interaction with Woman so that
the coefficient associated with Woman is still the average effect of being a woman.
The unconditional probability of applying is lower for women than for men in both
tracks, and the negative impact of being female remains roughly as large once we include
individual characteristics, the marginal effect being -0.033 for professors and -0.071 for
researchers. The effect is large: being a woman is equivalent to dividing the number of
single-authored publications by around 2, and implies that in both tracks the probability
is about 50% higher for men than for women even when controlling for observables.
In order to understand what lies behind the gender gap in seeking promotion, we
examine whether the effect of gender differs between the two types of positions. Since the
objective costs of the agre´gation contest are substantially larger than those in the CNRS,
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the coefficient on women should be higher for university professors than for researchers if
differences in these costs where holding back potential female candidates. Column (5) of
Table 5 hence runs a difference-in-differences regression where we have pooled together
the data for the two types of concours. We interact all variables with a dummy taking
the value 1 for the CNRS concours to allow for different impacts across the two tracks,
our coefficient of interest being women interacted with this dummy.18 The direct gender
effect remains negative, while the interacted coefficient is negative but insignificant at the
10% level, implying that, if anything, the larger coefficient for CNRS implies a stronger
reluctance for women to enter the CNRS concours. These results are not consistent with
the hypothesis that the reason why women do not apply for promotion are the costs
associated to seeking promotion in the university track.
The last two columns of Table 5 consider the role of location by interacting the female
dummy with being in a department in or around Paris (we also considered interaction
with being in an international department but the coefficient was never significant). For
researchers we find an insignificant difference, while the coefficient is positive and signi-
ficant for professors, indicating that the application gap between men and women in the
Ile de France region is lower than for other women.19 This difference has several possible
interpretations: it could be that the high concentration of economics departments in
and around Paris makes it more likely that successful candidates can change department
without moving their residence, that being in Paris reduces the cost of preparing the
concours, or it could simply capture better unobservables of women in the Paris region.
Our results thus indicate that there is a substantial gender gap in the likelihood
to apply for promotion. The negative and significant coefficient is robust to different
specifications of the model, such as logit, probit, and controlling for time since the first
publication (see the supplementary material). We also run a random effects model as
well as a duration model where we estimate time to first application for promotion; both
yielded equivalent results.
As further test of sensitivity to the functional form used, we estimate the applica-
tion gap using propensity–score reweighting, which allows us to compute women’s mean
probability of applying if they had the same distribution of observables as men. We use
the re-weighting method of DiNardo et al. (1996), which involves re-weighing females
such that they correspond to the male distribution of observed characteristics (or vice-
versa) and which they show is equivalent to non-parametric matching. Table 6 reports
the estimated probability of applying using the raw data, as well as four re-weighting
18To save space, other interacted terms are not reported here but in the supplementary material. Note
that the specification in column (5) gives the same results as a weighted comparison between those in
columns (2) and (3).
19To obtain the overall impact of gender, note that the variable Ile de France has been centered. Its
average value for women is 34.9%, implying that the total effect of gender is -0.012 for women in the Ile
de France and -0.044 for the rest.
17
Table 6: Share of candidates among potential candidates, reweighting
University CNRS
Women Men Diff. Women Men Diff.
Prob. Candidate 0.060 0.090 −0.030a 0.115 0.203 −0.088a
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.014) (0.024)
Wom. reweight logit 0.054 0.090 −0.036a 0.145 0.203 −0.057b
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.019) (0.014) (0.025)
Wom. reweight probit 0.054 0.090 −0.037a 0.146 0.203 −0.057b
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.019) (0.014) (0.025)
Men reweight logit 0.060 0.092 −0.032a 0.115 0.186 −0.072a
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.014) (0.024)
Men reweight probit 0.060 0.092 −0.032a 0.115 0.187 −0.072a
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.014) (0.024)
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. a, b, c Difference between men and women significant at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
estimates that use all the control variables considered in our estimation, employ a logit
or probit specification, and take either women or men as the reference group. The gap
for university professors is stable across estimations. The results for the CNRS show
greater variation, with the estimates ranging between 0.057 and 0.088. These values
are nevertheless large compared with the base male application probability (0.203) and
highly significant, indicating that the application gap is not driven by differences in the
distribution of observables nor by the particular functional form we employ.
4.2.2 Gender differences in success in the concours
We turn next to differences in the probability of being promoted conditional on having
applied for promotion. Table 7 reports results for this probability and indicates that
research output is the key determinant of the probability of success in both the univer-
sity and CNRS concours. In the former, all three measures of research output have a
significant coefficient, while for the CNRS promotion only quality matters, consistent
with stronger selection in this track. Being in an international department has a positive
impact on the probability of passing the agre´gation, in line with our arguments above,
while it has no impact on the probability of being promoted in the CNRS contest.
Turning to our coefficient of interest, the impact of being female on the probability of
success conditional on being a candidate, there is a negative but not significant difference
across the genders. The coefficient on Woman is insignificant both for the raw probabi-
lities and when we control for individual characteristics, for professors and researchers.20
The coefficients are large, -0.046 for professors, implying a reduction in the probability
of success of 21% compared to the male baseline (0.216), and -0.063 for the CNRS (a
20These results are robust to the use of a logit and a probit model (see the supplementary material).
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Table 7: Likelihood to be promoted conditional on applying
University CNRS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Woman -0.029 -0.035 -0.046 -0.068 -0.079 -0.063
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.059) (0.053) (0.061)
Age -0.032b -0.032b -0.048 -0.042
(0.013) (0.014) (0.039) (0.039)
Age2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Publisher(Pub) 0.175a 0.157a 0.004 0.028
(0.046) (0.048) (0.124) (0.137)
Pub*Quantity 0.074a 0.074a 0.063c 0.075c
(0.020) (0.020) (0.038) (0.041)
Pub*Quality 0.057a 0.053a 0.041a 0.039b
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.018)
Int. Department 0.093a -0.010
(0.036) (0.069)
Ile de France 0.023 0.067
(0.033) (0.074)
Pos. other than univ. 0.001
(0.036)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.030 0.150 0.164 0.043 0.192 0.197
Observations 781 781 781 198 198 198
Notes: Linear probability model (OLS). Standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. a, b,
c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Pos. other than univ.: assistant professor
positions in economics outside France, as well as CNRS researchers, and assistant professors from other
disciplines.
30% gap). These results are not fully conclusive, as the lack of significance could be due
to our sample being small (there are, respectively, only 188 and 41 women amongst the
candidates) or could reflect the lack of ex-post discrimination against women.
To further understand the promotion outcome, we exploit the fact that for the agre´gation
we have information on which individuals passed each stage of the competition, as well
as the final rank. After the penultimate stage a list of admissible candidates is provided
and after the final test a ranking of all successful candidates is published. If p positions
are available that year, the top p candidates are promoted. Our first test considers the
probability that a candidate is declared admissible. We next examine the likelihood to
be promoted for the sample of admissible candidates since this way we eliminate the
(presumably predominantly male) bottom tail of the distribution of applicants. To make
our sample even more comparable, we construct from the final ranking a list of indivi-
duals close to the threshold. We take, for each year, the n admissible candidates that
did not get promoted and the n lowest-ranked candidates that were. If discrimination
against women were taking place, it would be likely to appear in this reduced sample of
candidates with similar observable and probably close unobservable characteristics.
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Table 8: Conditional likelihood to be admissible and promoted, University
Likelihood to Likelihood to be promoted
be admissible Admissibles Close to threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Woman -0.041 -0.060c 0.004 -0.017 0.037 0.054
(0.037) (0.035) (0.074) (0.074) (0.099) (0.105)
Age -0.028c -0.062 -0.071
(0.015) (0.041) (0.066)
Age2 0.000 0.002 0.003
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Publisher(Pub) 0.235a -0.086 -0.100
(0.049) (0.105) (0.152)
Pub*Quantity 0.097a 0.038 0.018
(0.021) (0.048) (0.071)
Pub*Quality 0.066a 0.020 0.026
(0.009) (0.017) (0.024)
Int. Department 0.039 0.202a 0.190c
(0.039) (0.071) (0.098)
Ile de France 0.047 -0.015 0.020
(0.037) (0.071) (0.097)
Pos. other than univ. -0.033 0.072 0.032
(0.039) (0.088) (0.128)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.035 0.204 0.048 0.114 0.050 0.112
Observations 781 781 236 236 145 145
Notes: The likelihood to be admissible is conditional on applying. The likelihood of promotion is condi-
tional on being admissible. Linear probability model (OLS). Standard errors clustered by individuals in
brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Pos. other than univ.: assistant
professor positions in economics outside France, as well as CNRS researchers, and assistant professors
from other disciplines.
The first two columns of Table 8 consider the probability that a candidate is declared
admissible. Research output plays a major role, with the coefficients being even larger
than in the previous table, as we would expect. The coefficient on Woman remains
negative, large (amounting to about 20% of men’s probability), and is significant at
the 10% level. The next test focuses on admissible candidates only, and supports our
hypothesis that candidates at this stage are more homogeneous than in the entire sample,
as the quantity and quality of publications have no significant impact, and only being
in an international department matters. The regressions indicate that there is a small,
negative and insignificant effect of being a woman, which amounts to only 2% of the
probability of success of admissible men (69%). The last two columns consider the 2n
candidates close to the threshold, and report a positive and not significant coefficient,
which is nevertheless of considerable size (10% of the probability of success which is 50%
by construction).
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4.2.3 Interpreting the results
Our results find a large but not significant gender gap in the probability to be promoted
conditional on applying. A possible interpretation is that this gap is zero and observed
promotions are entirely due to the application gap. Alternatively, we can take the opposite
extreme view and decompose the overall probability of being promoted into the two
steps, ignoring differences in parameter significance. Denote by Pr(A,m) the probability
that men apply and by Pr(S,m) that of succeeding conditional on applying, and so
on. The gap in promotions between men and women can be expressed as Pr(A,m) ×
Pr(S,m) − Pr(A, f) × Pr(S, f), which can in turn be written as Pr(S) × ∆ Pr(A) +
Pr(A) × ∆ Pr(S), where ∆ Pr(.) ≡ Pr(.,m) − Pr(., f) is the gap in probabilities and
Pr(.) is the (unweighted) average Pr(.) ≡ (Pr(.,m)+Pr(., f))/2. The first term denotes
the differences due to the gap in application propensity, while the second term captures
the gap due to differences in success conditional on being a candidate.
For both tracks, we decompose the overall gap into the probability of applying and
that of being promoted conditional on applying. In the case of professors, the latter
is the product of the likelihood of being admissible and that of success conditional on
being admissible, hence we further decompose into these two stages.21 We next use the
coefficients reported in Tables 5, 7, and 8 (columns 2, 3, and 4, respectively), to compute
which share of these contributions is explained by observables other than gender and how
much is due to gender or ‘unexplained’.
The top panel in Table 9 reports the results for professors, giving the probabilities for
the two groups, the gap, and the contribution of each stage to the overall promotion gap,
with the last two columns presenting the explained and unexplained shares. Almost 70%
of the raw gender gap for professors is due to the application gap, and its contribution
is even larger (76%) when we control for characteristics. The share of the gap that is
explained by characteristics is small (16.4%) and favours women. For the CNRS we find
that the gap in application propensity explains 55.3% of the raw gap, most of which (44.3
percentage points) is not explained by characteristics. Although not as strong as in the
university sample, these results confirm that the application stage is crucial, and while
men now have better characteristics than women, the share explained by characteristics
remains moderate. Three clear results emerge. First, the application stage plays an
important role as it explains between half and three-quarters of the overall promotion
gap. Second, the gender gap in the probability of being a candidate is mainly driven
by the direct effect of gender rather than by differences in publications. Third, for the
sample for which we have data, our results indicate a gender gap in the admissibility
stage of the contest but virtually none latter on.
Given the importance of the gap in the propensity to apply, we would like to assess
21The details of the decomposition are provided in the appendix.
21
Table 9: Decomposition of the unconditional probability of promotion
Women Men Diff. Contr. (%) Expl. (%) Unexpl. (%)
University
Applying 0.060 0.090 -0.030 69.6 -6.9 76.5
Promotion/Apply 0.181 0.216 -0.035 30.4 -9.5 39.9
Admiss./Apply 0.266 0.314 -0.048 28.3 -7.1 35.4
Promotion/Admiss. 0.680 0.688 -0.008 2.1 -2.1 4.2
Promotion 0.011 0.020 -0.009 100.0
CNRS
Applying 0.115 0.203 -0.088 55.3 11.0 44.3
Promotion/Apply 0.133 0.211 -0.077 44.7 7.8 36.4
Promotion 0.015 0.043 -0.027 100.0
Notes: Contr.: contribution of each probability to the overall promotion gap. Expl. (resp. Unexpl.):
shares of the overall promotion gap that are due to the explained (rep. unexplained) term in each of the
probabilities. The probability of promotion conditional on applying (Promotion/Apply) is the product of
the probability of being admissible conditional on applying and of being promoted conditional on being
admissible.
whether women apply too little or men apply too much. This is not straightforward
since we have no direct measure of which potential candidates should apply. To try to
answer this question we look at who is a candidate at different points of the distribution
of the predicted probability of success. We compute a measure of Xitβ̂ for each potential
candidate using the coefficients obtained in the equation for the probability of being
admissible (column 2 in Table 8) and we interpret it as a measure of the ‘quality of the
potential candidate’.22 We compute this measure of quality for all potential candidates
and its distribution. Figure 2 plots for men and women the non-parametric functions
fitted to the probability of being a candidate as a function of Xitβ̂ (centered around its
mean) as well as the 95% confidence intervals. In order to increase the readability of the
graph, we removed the top 5% of the Xitβ̂ distribution.
23 Table 10 reports the gaps for
the various quartiles of the distribution, as well as for the top 5%.
If men were applying too much we would expect the gap to be mainly at the bottom
of the distribution, while if women were applying too little, we would expect to see large
gaps at the top where the probability of promotion is substantial. At the bottom of the
distribution, men do not seem to overapply as the gap is small for low values of Xitβ̂.
It then increases rapidly and remains roughly constant at 3 percentage points up to the
95th percentile. For the top 5% of the distribution, the gap increases dramatically: 25%
22We consider only professors as there are too few observations for the CNRS. The results are similar
if we use the coefficients for the probability of promotion. We choose the probability of being admissible
as this equation has a higher R2, indicating that we explain better this stage than the promotion stage.
This difference is partly due to the fact that promotions depend on the candidate’s quality but also on
the number of positions available.
23The range of values for this group is large (from 0.398 to 1.11 after centering), which made it difficult
to appreciate visually the gap for the rest of the distribution.
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Figure 2: Graph of the non-parametric function f of the probability of being a candidate
P (C) = f(Xitβ̂) of admissibility, trimming top 5% of Xβ̂
of men and 15.8% of women apply, implying a 9 point gap. The relative gap is bell-
shaped. It is particularly large in the second quartile where the probability of promotion
is very low, it then declines steadily to 18% for the group between the 75th and 95th
percentiles, but rises sharply again at the very top (a gap of 37%). The probability of
promotion is three times as high for the top 5% than for the 75-95 percentile, yet the
share of women that are candidates increases by only 10% while that for men rises almost
by 44%. It is difficult to conclude from these results whether men overapply or women
underapply. What we find is that men are very likely to apply in the second quartile
where the probability of success is low, and that the best women (those at the top 5%)
are not increasing their likelihood to apply in a way that correspond to the increase in
their probability of success when compared to next group down the distribution.
As we saw above, women also have a lower conditional probability of being promoted,
although the coefficient is not significant. This seems to be the result of a lower probabi-
lity of being admissible and a positive effect of being female among borderline admissible
candidates. Given how homogeneous candidates are in the last stage of the agre´gation, we
would expect that conscious discrimination would appear more among admissible candi-
dates, a stage where it is difficult for someone outside the committee to assess differences
between candidates. We find that, if anything, women are positively discriminated.
To further assess these differences, we compute the probability of a candidate being
admissible and of an admissible candidate being promoted as a function of their Xitβ̂
for the admissible stage. Figure 3 depicts these probabilities. The probability of being
admissible is similar at the bottom of the distribution but a considerable gap appears
for high-quality candidates. The promotion probability amongst admissibles shows an
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Table 10: Share of candidates by quartiles of the distribution of Xitβ̂ of admissibility
Women Men Diff. in % / men Prob. prom.
Total sample 0.060 0.090 −0.030a -34 0.017
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001)
1st quartile 0.011 0.014 −0.002 -17 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)
2nd quartile 0.017 0.051 −0.034a -66 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.001)
3rd quartile 0.071 0.105 −0.033b -32 0.010
(0.010) (0.008) (0.013) (0.002)
Top quartile 0.146 0.190 −0.045b -23 0.053
(0.014) (0.010) (0.018) (0.005)
75-95 percentiles 0.143 0.174 −0.031 -18 0.038
(0.016) (0.011) (0.020) (0.005)
Top 5% 0.158 0.250 −0.092c -37 0.099
(0.037) (0.025) (0.048) (0.013)
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The
values of Xitβ̂ are calculated using all coefficients but the one associated with Woman from column (2)
of Table 8.
interesting pattern, as at the top of the distribution the probability of success of women
is higher than that of men and close to one. These two apparently contradictory results
have a possible explanation. The negative effect at the admissibility stage could be
the result of either men being better at ‘promoting’ their work (either because men
overestimate their contribution or women underestimate it) or of women being subject
to unconscious discrimination by committee members (the committee underestimate the
contribution of a woman). In contrast, at the last stage of the competition, conscious
positive discrimination could be in operation, favouring high productivity women.
4.3 Assessing the bias from selection on unobservables
Given the central role of the probability to apply, we performed a number of robustness
tests of our results, looking at different subsamples, such as first-time applicants, and
including additional variables such as coauthor networks, all of which confirmed the ro-
bustness of the effect we have identified.24 A further concern is that despite our attempts
to control for observable factors, our estimates could be biased by unobservable factors
correlated with both research output and selection into seeking promotion. In this sec-
tion we assess the likelihood that the estimates are biased by unobservables by following
the strategy proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) who provide a measure of the relative
importance of selection on unobservables. It evaluates how much stronger selection on
unobservables must be relative to selection on observables in order to explain the effect of
24Results are available in the supplementary material.
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Figure 3: Graphs of the distributions of the conditional likelihood to be admissible and
promoted at a function of Xitβ̂ of admissibility
Probability of being admissible Probability of success among admissible
our variable of interest. The measure consists of comparing the coefficients of two regres-
sions, one with a restricted set of control variables β̂R, and one with a full set of controls,
β̂F . The measure of the maximum importance of unobservables is given by the ratio
ρ̂ = β̂F/
(
β̂R − β̂F
)
. The numerator is the effect the robustness of which is tested, while
the denominator captures the fact that the smaller the gap between the two coefficients
is, the less the estimate is affected by selection on observables, implying that selection on
unobservables needs to be relatively stronger to explain the effect estimated in the full
regression. Oster (2016) proposes a modified version of this ratio to take into account
the explanatory power of the observables through changes in the R2 of the regressions.
She proposes to compute the ratio δ̂ = ρ̂ (R2F −R2R) / (R2max −R2F ), where R2F and R2R
are the R-squared of the full and restricted regressions, while R2max is a measure of the
maximum R2 expected in the data. We follow Oster (2016) and use R2max = 1.3× R2F .25
Both papers propose a rule of thumb such that when ρ̂ or δ̂ are above 1 the probability
that unobservables can drive the value estimated is low.
Table 11 considers two sets of regressions. For the likelihood to apply, our restricted
regressions are those in columns (1) and (3) of Table 5, with only gender as an explanatory
variable. As full regressions we consider columns (2) and (4) of Table 5 that include
age, research output, and department of origin. For the conditional probability of being
promoted, we use as restricted regressions columns (1) and (4) of Table 7, and columns (3)
and (6) as full regressions. None of the ratios is less than one. It is even always negative
for the University. Their absolute value ranges from 2.7 to 29.5 for the University and
from 3.2 to 36.4 for the CNRS, with averages of 12.3 and 15.6 respectively, implying
25Oster proposes the value R2max = 1.3×R2F following an analysis of papers in top economics journals
performing randomised experiments. She chooses the cut-off so that the results in 90% of the published
papers are robust. Nevertheless, we performed robustness exercises by looking at the cases of R2max
= 1.5 × R2F and R2max = 1.7 × R2F . Both yielded values for δ̂ above 3 in absolute value (see the
supplementary material).
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Table 11: Selection on unobservables
Likelihood to: apply be promoted
ρ̂ δ̂ ρ̂ δ̂
University −9.3 −29.5 −2.7 −7.5
CNRS 3.2 8.8 13.9 36.4
Notes: ρ̂ = β̂F /
(
β̂R − β̂F
)
, δ̂ = ρ̂
(
R2F − R2R
)
/
(
0.3 R2F
)
. β̂R and R
2
R are the gender coefficients and
R-squared of columns (1) and (3) of Table 5 (likelihood to apply) and of columns (1) and (4) of Table 7
(likelihood to be promoted conditional on applying). β̂F and R
2
F are the gender coefficients and R-squared
of columns (2) and (4) of Table 5 (apply) and of columns (3) and (6) of Table 7 (be promoted).
that in order to attribute the entire value of the coefficient on gender to selection effects,
selection on unobservables would have to be at least twice that on observables and, on
average, 14 times as strong. These are large values, which make us conclude that the
coefficient on gender is unlikely to be fully explained by selection on unobservables.
5 Conclusions
This paper uses data for promotions among academic economists in France to look at
competing explanations for the gap in promotions between men and women, exploiting
the fact that we have information both on who was a candidate for promotion and who
could have been a candidate. On the one hand, women may be less likely to be promoted
conditional on having applied, potentially due to discrimination; on the other, female
academics may have a lower propensity to apply for promotion than males. The features
of the French academic system, such as a national salary scale, the need to go through
a national contest in order to be promoted, and the existence of several categories of
academics with different requirements during the contest and upon promotion, allow us
to examine various hypotheses for these differences.
We find that women are less likely than men to enter promotion contests, and that
this gap accounts for between 50 and 76% of the promotion gap. Although we are unable
to assess whether women underapply or men overapply, we find a particularly large gap
at the top of the research-quality distribution, raising the question of whether some of
the best women are self-censoring themselves. The conditional probability of promotion
is also lower for women, but the coefficient is not significant. Our detailed analysis of
the various stages of the competition indicates a negative effect of being a women in the
early stages but a positive one amongst similar candidates in the last stage.
There are various possible explanations for our findings. Women could derive lower
utility from promotion and this would reduce their likelihood to seek it. Also, although
women are not discriminated against during the contest they may believe they will be, and
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hence decide not to enter the competition. The alternative explanation is that women
are less willing than men to enter contests, in line with experimental evidence. It is
difficult to distinguish between these hypotheses with the data available. However, the
fact that the objective cost to seek promotion as a researcher is virtually null implies that
even if the benefits from promotion and the expected probability of success were low, all
individuals should apply for promotion. Hence not doing so indicates an unwillingness
to enter the contest per se, which is therefore stronger for women.
Our results have two main implications. First, they indicate that women’s lower
propensity to take part in contests is observed in actual labour markets and that it can
have important consequences for observed outcomes. Second, they raise the question of
what type of policy intervention can help increase female promotion rates. The evidence
in Gneezy et al. (2003) indicates that differences in contest participation are driven by
women being less confident than men. Building confidence is a difficult process and
probably starts in early childhood, but changes in the way in which deciding whether to
enter a competition occurs could facilitate women’s probabilities of climbing up the rank
ladder. For example, a system of mentoring whereby junior faculty are assigned a mentor
that ‘proposes’ them as candidates for promotion may increase women’s propensity to
apply. Alternatively, creating a system in which the default is that an individual will be
considered for promotion after x years and the individual has to opt out instead of opting
in, could also be a way of overcoming the differences across genders.
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Appendix
A Decomposition
Denote by Pr(A,m) (resp. Pr(A, f)) the probability that men (resp. women) apply, by
Pr(S,m) (resp. Pr(S, f)) that of succeeding conditional on applying and by ∆ Pr(.) ≡
Pr(.,m) − Pr(., f) the gap in any probabilities between men and women. The gap in
promotions (P ) between men and women can then be expressed as:
∆ Pr(P ) = Pr(P,m)− Pr(P, f) = Pr(A,m)× Pr(S,m)− Pr(A, f)× Pr(S, f)
=
Pr(S,m) + Pr(S, f)
2
∆ Pr(A) +
Pr(A,m) + Pr(A, f)
2
∆ Pr(S). (4)
The first term denotes the differences due to the gap in application propensity, while
the second term captures the gap due to differences in success conditional on being a
candidate.
Adding the admissible stage for the University track, with Pr(Ad, .) the probability
of being admissible conditional on applying and with Pr(S, .) now that of succeeding
conditionnal on being admissible, the gap in promotions can be expressed as:
∆ Pr(P ) = Pr(A,m)× Pr(Ad,m)× Pr(S,m)− Pr(A, f)× Pr(Ad, f)× Pr(S, f)
=
Pr(Ad,m) Pr(S,m) + Pr(Ad, f) Pr(S, f)
2
∆ Pr(A)
+
Pr(A,m) + Pr(A, f)
2
Pr(S,m) + Pr(S, f)
2
∆ Pr(Ad)
+
Pr(A,m) + Pr(A, f)
2
Pr(Ad,m) + Pr(Ad, f)
2
∆ Pr(S). (5)
The explained part ‘Expl.’ of the overall promotion gap is
Pr(S,m) + Pr(S, f)
2
(
¯
XfA − ¯XfA) β̂A +
Pr(A,m) + Pr(A, f)
2
(X¯mS − ¯XfS) β̂S, (6)
and the unexplained part ‘Unexpl.’ is then Pr(S,m)+Pr(S,f)
2
β̂fA +
Pr(A,m)+Pr(A,f)
2
β̂fS.
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